A ceasefire with Russia through negotiations?
Is there any indication in Eastern Europe of an imminent peace? At first glance, a series of recent trends might suggest so. On one hand, Ukraine is under immense pressure both on the battlefield and on the international stage. Russian troops are advancing slowly yet decisively in Donbas, and Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are becoming increasingly devastating.
In the United States, newly elected President Donald Trump has stated he wants to end the war as quickly as possible. A phalanx of populist parties has emerged in Western and Central-Eastern Europe, for whom international law, European solidarity, and democratic values – and thus the fate of Ukraine – are of secondary importance at best. Not only radical left and right factions but also some centrist politicians, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, are campaigning as potential peacemakers, whose common sense supposedly prevents the escalation of the war.
On the other hand, Putin's regime in Russia is under economic pressure. Inflation is rising, and the value of the ruble is falling. Russia's human and material losses on the Ukrainian front are enormous, and Moscow can only partially compensate for them. In the Middle East, South Caucasus, and Central Asia, Russia is being pushed out as a power factor, and along with this, Putin is losing his reputation as a geopolitical strategist. In both Ukraine and Russia, recent surveys show that the majority of the population supports an immediate ceasefire.
Does this finally give Europe a chance to put an end to the war for good? Unlikely, as most good intentions and proposals in this direction lead to a dead end. Many ceasefire plans and more far-reaching settlement ideas do not take into account the basic aspirations of the involved parties. They contradict both Russia's ambitious hegemonic aspirations and Ukraine's fundamental security interests. The formula "nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine" is not only a noble political maxim but also a guarantee of survival for Kyiv. Russia seeks not merely to limit the Ukrainian nation but to eliminate it as an independent cultural community and sovereign national state.
However, many peace projects consciously or unconsciously develop conflict resolution strategies that involve rewarding Russia for its military aggression and punishing Ukraine for its nuclear disarmament. Similar to the consequences of the current generations' negligence towards the environment, international recognition of Russia's victory in Ukraine would plant a time bomb under the international security system. A partial ceasefire is already possible today for some time. However, consolidating Russia's territorial gains and/or the loss of Ukraine's sovereignty would encourage the repetition and emulation of actions by subsequent Russian or other revisionist governments.
Moreover, a treaty-enshrined territorial and/or political reduction of the Ukrainian national state would serve as a warning signal for other countries around the world that are relatively weaker against their neighbors. Regardless of whether governments are democratically elected or come to power through undemocratic means, many will rethink their national security strategies. Likely regional arms races could emerge. New nuclear weapon programs and the termination of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons would become real prospects.
Many supporters of Ukraine's partial capitulation now portray themselves as friends of peace and opponents of war. However, they must say not only "A" but also "B": the price of Russia's victory, which is currently the only possible temporary conclusion to the war, will not only be a glaring injustice towards Ukraine. It will also undermine the international security system.
Humanity would enter a sort of "new old world": the stronger would again redraw borders, imperial states would militarily suppress the weaker, and expansionist governments would commit genocide with impunity. Only those willing to pay such a high price have the right to demand the cessation of arms supplies to Ukraine, the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and the transfer of Ukrainian trophies – occupied territories, deported children, expropriated property, etc. – to Moscow.
Many apparent friends of peace do not notice their rhetorical support for Russian imperialists and war instigators. Most so-called opponents of the war in Europe forget or silence the fact that it involves rewarding aggressive campaigns and thereby increasing the likelihood of future wars. Allowing the aggressor to reap the rewards of its aggression is seen as de-escalation rather than a mistaken pacifist strategy that increases the likelihood of the use of force again.
In addition to their ignorance of the high level of collateral damage to global and security politics in the event of Russia's victory, many supporters of negotiations suffer from political naivety regarding Russia's imperial intentions. Today's Moscow leadership may not yet fully exhibit fascist traits, but it seeks much more than limiting sovereignty and transferring territories in Ukraine. The ultimate goal is not only the liquidation of an independent Ukrainian national state as much as possible.
Ukraine is also a political testing ground, a geostrategic tool, a military deployment zone, and a reservoir of resources for Russia in achieving its broader goals in Eastern Europe and beyond. Since 2022, both Moscow's hostility and its aims towards the West have been steadily increasing. The subjugation of Ukraine is now less a prize than the first step in Moscow's fundamental restructuring of European and global politics. This does not yet mean an immediate continuation of kinetic war beyond Ukraine. Repeated threats from Moscow to use conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction against the West are not harbingers of action but part of a hybrid toolkit aimed at destroying democratic societies, states, and organizations.
At certain stages, diplomatic actions are also a relevant subversive tool for Moscow, rather than an alternative approach to conflict resolution. As recently articulated by Swedish political scientist Charlotte Rode, the "Russian theater of negotiations" serves more performative and manipulative functions than practical ones. The minimal goal of negotiations may be to hold the negotiating partner, while the maximal goal is to gain concessions that would otherwise have to be obtained purely militarily. Foreign supporters of negotiations today act as "useful idiots" of the Kremlin, facilitating Moscow's hybrid war and inadvertently hindering the achievement of a real and lasting peaceful settlement by strengthening Ukraine.
The Russian attack on Ukraine is not only a war of conquest and a war of annihilation, but it also serves as a wedge for Moscow. Debates about aid to Ukraine and ending the war divide Western parties, parliaments, governments, and alliances. The flow of refugees from Ukraine strengthens anti-Western populist parties, such as the "Alternative for Germany" and the coalition of Sahra Wagenknecht in the Federal Republic of Germany. Last but not least, Russia, having conquered Ukraine through military, diplomatic, or combined means, would use it as a springboard and resource for Moscow's actions in the West – whether kinetic or hybrid.
European states, as well as other Western and non-Western countries, must have a range of national interests in achieving a just peace to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, this will only be possible with new successful Ukrainian offensive operations based on well-equipped modern weaponry. As long as this fundamental condition is not met, the search for balance and compromise with Moscow will only fuel Russia's already adventurous foreign policy ambitions rather than contain them.
Translated from Polish
The text was published as part of a cooperation project between ZAXID.NET and the Polish magazine Nowa Europa Wschodnia.
Original title of the article: Wynegocjowany rozejm z Rosją?