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Generals should not be in the trenches: how to ensure that high-ranking commanders truly grasp the realities of war.

Military blogger Alexander Karpuk sees no benefit in placing a general in a trench. He believes that it won't improve their understanding of service — to truly transform a general, the system needs to change, and a trench won't achieve that.
Генералам не место в окопах: как добиться, чтобы высшие командиры осознавали истинные реалии войны.

On the topic of "generals in the trenches."

Unfortunately, it doesn’t work that way. You can't place a person who holds absolute power over others into a trench and expect them to sit there, learn everything a company commander deals with from scratch, and then implement it.

They won't implement it.

A general who listens to the company commander and addresses their needs is the one capable of implementing what is necessary on the battlefield.

Therefore, we need to either promote company commanders to positions where they can influence the system, or create a system that listens to the needs of platoon/company/command leaders.

A general in a trench is merely a façade, organized at the expense of the soldiers and the immediate commander responsible for the sector. Just because the entire unit is now defending the general's position instead of fighting won't give him a greater understanding of warfare.

A general is more of a logistics manager of war. Their task is to coordinate supply chains according to the existing system.

The way this coordination is structured and how effectively they respond to grassroots needs indicates their effectiveness.

A general can only operate within the framework of the existing military system.

Will a company commander who has been promoted to general succeed in this? No. It requires years of experience working in staff roles. That skill is essential too.

Will sitting in a trench make a general a better "logistics manager of war"? No.

Therefore, we need to develop a system that responds promptly on the battlefield, establish criteria for the effectiveness of the command staff, identify weaknesses and strategies to address them, and pinpoint individuals who are struggling with these tasks. This is challenging.

Moreover, it is problematic and not quick, because if we acknowledge that we have issues here and need reforms, it implies that someone prior failed to manage it, placing responsibility on the predecessor who, according to reports, was a hero and did everything right. The system always resists such "identification." However, we must acknowledge mistakes and correct them systematically.

Unfortunately, simple solutions will not resolve these issues.

The author expresses a personal opinion that may not align with the editorial position. The author bears responsibility for the published content in the "Opinions" section.

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