An alternative for Germany and the world.

November 2024 will be marked in the history of global politics by two significant events that occurred on either side of the Atlantic. First, on November 5, in the United States, Donald Trump won the presidential election in a manner that was not sensational but still somewhat unexpected. The surprise in his victory primarily lies in the results from seven swing states, where Kamala Harris was considered to have a fairly decent chance. In reality, we witnessed a total triumph for the former president of the United States, who transitioned from the 45th to the 47th.

The left-liberal policies of the American Democrats suffered a serious, if not catastrophic, defeat. Trump won the presidential election with a score of 312:226. The Senate, the upper chamber of the U.S. Congress, now stands at 53:44 (plus 2 independents) after the traditional midterm elections (34 out of 100 seats were renewed). In the House of Representatives, Republicans won with a tally of 218:213, plus 9:2 in states where votes are still being counted. Additionally, we can recall the gubernatorial elections, where the outcome of 8:3 in favor of the "elephants" also tipped the scales in favor of the Republican Party, with a total of 27:23.

There is much to discuss regarding the reasons behind the significant red victory, so substantial that even Donald Trump, participating in his third consecutive election, won the national popular vote, surpassing Kamala Harris by 2.5% (it is worth noting that he lost to Hillary Clinton by 2.1% and to Joe Biden by 4.5%). This includes the Democrats' failed preparations for the elections. Initially, they relied on the sitting president, who was openly losing to his opponent and often acted like a classic retiree with dementia rather than the leader of the world's most powerful nation. Then, after disastrous debates, he was replaced—essentially with no choice—by the vice president, who in subsequent debates demonstrated that, apart from criticizing Trump and scaring the electorate with him, she had nothing creative to offer. This also reflects a rather weak stance on Ukraine and Israel—both countries have their grievances (we feel they are providing insufficient help, while the Israelis feel their hands are being twisted where no one has asked for assistance). There are many reasons that can be identified for the Democratic Party's defeat...

…But one thing is clear—voters in the United States have shifted. Not without radicalism—otherwise, where would the term "Trumpists" come from?—but there are still many sensible, classic right-wing politicians within the Republican Party, akin to neo-Reaganites, who were gladly supported by the electorate. This demonstrated their attitude towards the previous political establishment from the Obama era and its preferences.

A few days later, on the eastern shores of the Atlantic, in Germany, a political crisis began—triggered by the dismissal of a coalition minister from the Free Democratic Party, culminating in a statement about a vote of confidence in the government—and potentially, early elections to the Bundestag in March 2025. It is worth noting that the current main coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, according to sociological data, currently occupy only third place, trailing several percentage points behind the far-right party "Alternative for Germany." The leading party, the CDU/CSU alliance, at the beginning of November, has a level of support that is nearly equal to the combined figures of AfD and SPD.

Moreover, the main point here is not the numbers themselves, but who stands behind these numbers. Because the center-right Christian Democratic Union, having lost Angela Merkel, has a new leader, Friedrich Merz, hailing from perhaps the most quintessentially German region of the Federal Republic, North Rhine-Westphalia (Merkel, as a reminder, entered big politics from the communist GDR). This immediately impacted the Union's stance, for instance, regarding arms supplies to Ukraine, which is currently one of the primary foreign policy issues for the top country in the European Union.

It cannot be said that the current Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, has not attempted to take steps in this direction. One only needs to recall the change of the defense minister from the overtly inert Christine Lambrecht to the much more active and decisive Boris Pistorius (who was even considered a potential successor to Scholz at the helm of the SPD and, in the future, the federal government right after his appointment). However, the left-centrist "traffic light" coalition has been seriously stalled due to the position of the reds—this was noted back in 2022 by the then Ukrainian ambassador to Germany, Andrii Melnyk. In fact, we still have not received long-range TAURUS missiles, even though not only the United Kingdom but also France has long provided such weaponry to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

But the most interesting and telling aspect of German politics is not this, but the statement from the leader of the CDU-CSU Bavarian party, Markus Söder (who had chances of becoming the leader of the Union and, potentially, the chancellor after Merkel's career ended, but it did not pan out)—he stated that after early elections, they would have no objection to a coalition with the SPD, but on one condition: Olaf Scholz would not be part of this coalition.

Both Merz and Söder have demonstrated a significantly sharper and much more anti-Russian stance since the onset of the full-scale war. Of course, all of this can be attributed to their opposition status—it's much easier to speak, promise, and scare when your words are likely to remain just that. However, both of these politicians have established themselves as such "hawks" even before February 24, 2022—thus, there are ample grounds to believe that they will pursue a similar policy at the helm of a new government coalition.

The two main countries of the Western, Euro-Atlantic alliance have noticeably shifted—one already by the mere fact of the elections, the other still only by polling, which has every chance of becoming reality in a few months. And we cannot overlook the "Alternative for Germany," which has long been building its support by positioning itself as an alternative to the indecisive classic top players of the German political market. Just a year ago, at the beginning of autumn, AfD lagged behind CDU/CSU by a respectable 5-7%—and indeed appeared as a certain alternative to the center-right in its part of the political spectrum. However, now the Union stands as the unchallenged leader of preferences, having not dropped below the 30% mark since late last year. Meanwhile, pro-Putin ultra-radicals are forced to compete with social democrats for...

Essentially, for nothing—because none of the three respectable parties (CDU-CSU, SPD, Greens) plan to tie their coalition fate with the "blues" (the base color of AfD). As we have mentioned, the leader of the CSU, Söder, has already outlined the contours of a future coalition—and there is no place for the "Alternative" in it.

And the center-right politicians—whether classic Reagan-style Republicans in the U.S. or the current Christian Democratic Union—have every chance of becoming a true alternative. An alternative to the ultra-radicals, who have been increasing their popularity since the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The leftist government in these countries has shown that it could not cope with this threat. The time has come for the right, true right-wing politicians, who, during our generation, successfully opposed the dictatorship centered in the Kremlin. We will see what the successors of Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl will bring this time.